American and British strategies for victory in 1776

• In these blogposts, I discuss questions and issues that students have raised in my classrooms during the previous semester. They are good springboards to classroom discussions/debates about the Revolution, American history, and history itself.

Washington’s strategy for the war took into account the poor soldiery of his men, the complete absence of an American navy, and the logistical difficulties the British faced when fighting in America.  He doubted his men’s ability to defeat the British on the battlefield, but hoped that they could do well enough to remain in the field and draw the war out.  As a student of early-modern warfare, he understood that wars are primarily contests of administration and attrition, and that in a long war, the rebels could exhaust British logistics, finances, diplomacy, and political will.

General Howe likewise understood from the start that although Britain was much stronger and richer, many of its advantages were diminished in the American theater.  In fact, already in 1774, when Parliament enacted the Coercive Acts, Howe warned Lord George Germain, the secretary for American affairs in London, that Britain would need to send 14,000 regular troops to saturate New England in order to prevent a general uprising.  Otherwise, he cautioned, a rebellion might break out that would necessitate many more than 14,000 men to suppress.  In the summer of 1776, when he landed in New York with 30,000 men, Howe was hoping and planning for a short war; one in which decisive early victories in the field might convince Americans to come to their senses, lay down their arms, and enjoy peace and prosperity as a part of the British Empire.

Howe had clear plans to capture the Hudson Valley and thus isolate New England to the east.  He did not have a clear determination, however, regarding the level of military intensity he would utilize in his campaign.  Germain advocated a scorched-earth policy with the paramount goal being a quick entrapment or destruction of Washington’s army by forcing Washington to try to stop this ongoing violence against American towns, farms, and civilians.  Germain held that because there was no center to the rebellion, it would persist as long as the main rebel force remained in the field.  Thus, he advocated winning the war militarily first, and worrying about rebuilding the bonds of friendship and loyalty later on.

The Howe brothers, by contrast, felt that a scorched earth policy, even if successful militarily, would only feed anti-British sentiment in America, and would thus necessitate stationing an army of occupation there to prevent future unrest.  Moreover, like many in England, they were convinced that the rebellion was carried forth by a vocal minority and that there was a silent Loyalist majority forced to remain silent due to Patriot violence and intimidation.  Thus, the Howes wanted to use their army and fleet gently, to impress and intimidate the Americans, rather than to terrorize them, burn their farms, seize their crops and livestock, and destroy their infrastructure.  They considered the American War to be a war over the hearts and minds of Americans, and did not want to lend credence to Patriot propaganda about British tyranny.  Indeed, the Howes were appointed by the Crown to act as peace commissioners once the rebels surrendered.  So they were not simply concerned, as was Germain, with winning the war; they were thinking also about the war’s impact on postwar relations.

This might explain the Howe brothers’ perplexing failure to capture or destroy the American army – 28,000 men under George Washington’s command – at the Battle of Brooklyn Heights (1776).   It was arguably Britain’s best chance throughout the war to do irreparable damage to rebel forces.   Some argue that unfavorable winds prevented Admiral Howe from entering the East River, while others suggest it was a simple lapse of judgment.  Some claim that General Howe was cautious by nature and constantly feared that he did not have sufficient manpower to accomplish his mission.  Others defend Howe, pointing out that he followed the accepted European practice, as well as the lesson that he himself learned as an officer at the Battle of Bunker Hill.  Considering his limited manpower, he chose not to risk a frontal assault against entrenched forces.  After all, as peace commissioner, Howe was interested in de-escalating the war by persuading the colonists that his army was unstoppable, that resistance was futile, and that surrender was the only responsible solution.  A single tactical defeat at the hands of Washington would make this scenario impossible, forcing the British to wage multiple campaigns in America. 

Moreover, even a successful assault on Washington’s army spelled danger for Howe – a massacre of Washington’s men in Brooklyn threatened to inflame Americans further, converting Loyalists in the middle and southern colonies into Patriots.  Howe therefore chose to besiege the Americans and force a surrender over time, without losing British troops, without risking defeat, and without annihilating the rebel army.

Washington saved his army – and perhaps the Patriot cause – by spiriting it out of Long Island, taking advantage of Admiral Howe’s failure to take command of the river.  In the following weeks and months, Howe slowly and cautiously pursued Washington up and down the Hudson River Valley and New Jersey, inflicting casualties and taking captives throughout, until Washington eventually managed to cross the Delaware River into Pennsylvania (December 1776). 

The Battle of Brooklyn Heights and the long dismal retreat that followed were important in shaping Washington as a general.  They instilled in him fear and caution; he never again allowed himself to be drawn into such a strategically risky situation.  By the same token, the New York campaign convinced General Howe that the rebellion was no longer limited to New England alone (if it ever was).   No longer trusting that Germain’s plan to occupy the Hudson River Valley could prevent a long war by isolating New England, Howe made one last attempt to win the war quickly. 

What he hoped to do was to recreate the Battle of Brooklyn Heights, setting up a large-scale battle that would (this time around) destroy the American Army and thus win the war.  To draw Washington into such a battle for a second time, Howe threatened Philadelphia, the seat of the rebel government.  His hope was to compel Washington to defend his capital city and the Continental Congress itself.   Howe defeated Washington at the Battle of Brandywine (1777), but failed again to end the war on the battlefield.   Convinced that the war could not be won, he resigned his command. 

From 1775 to 1781, the British Army’s operations in America show the British high command grabbing at straws strategically – formulating a plan for victory in Massachusetts in 1775 only to change it in 1776 with the New York campaign; abandoning the 1776 plan in 1777 to target Philadelphia; changing course again in 1778 with Clinton’s southern campaign; and forsaking the southern scheme in 1781 for operations in Virginia.  These shifts in geographic focus represented conceptual shifts in strategy – from trying to pacify the Americans through economic asphyxiation, to targeting their army, to conquering territory and shoring up Loyalist local governments, to again seeking a decisive battle.

At each stage and in every location, British strategy expected and depended on what was believed to be strong Loyalist support in a given region – the middle colonies, southern colonies, and trans-Appalachian West.  The British Army traveled from colony to colony in search of Loyalist manpower that could make its war plans feasible, but the Loyalist groundswell never materialized.  British policymakers were trapped in a misunderstanding of the conflict.  They believed that the Patriot opposition was a radical and fringe element, when in fact, the Revolutionists’ understanding of English law, the imperial constitution, and Parliament’s lawlessness was conventional and widespread.  Only in 1781 did the British government finally comprehend that it would not find Loyalist support in America, and that winning the war without the colonists was beyond its financial capabilities.